II This term 'nonerroneous' (abhranta) isn't an original idea of Dharmakirti.
We can find mention of it as 'avibhranta' in the Yogacarabhumi. Also, in the Nyayasutra (1-1-4), 'avyabhicarin' is used as the same meaning as abhranta'.
The definition of perception in the YBhu is closer to the Pvin and the NB than the NM and the PS. But as the YBhu states that perception has conceptual construction, YBhu is quite different from the Pvin, the NB, the NM and the PS.
The definition of perception in the YBhu is close to the NS, because perception in the NS entails conception. Dignaga makes no mention of 'nonerroneous' in his definition of perception, not because he doesn't think that perception entails conception but tha tthere is no error in his theory of self-cognition (svasarhvedana).
He considers that all cognition is self-cognition. An object of cognition isn't the reality of the empirical world but of self-knowledge. The Naiyayika uses 'nonerroneous' (avyabhicarin; NS 1-1-4) in his definition of perception. Dignaga, in the PS, criticizes the use of 'nonerroneous' (avyabhicarin), because he considers this word isn't necessary. According to Dignaga, perception is knowledge i. e. without
being able to name it, one can have knowledge of an object. Also, direct perception doesn't entail conception. Since we can understand it as an error or not after an object gets a name, Dignaga says 'nonerroneous' (avyabhicarin) isn't necessary in the definition of perception. Still this isn't the only reason that Dignaga doesn't define 'nonerroneous' in his definition of perception. III Dharmakirti doesn't formulate conception within perception the same way as Dignaga. He considers that the reality has 'causal efficiency' (arthakriya). This idea differs from Dignaga. This epistemology of Dharmakirti is an idea of Sautrantika. Dharmakirti defines true knowledge (pramana) as "knowledge that doesn't contradict (the real object)" (avisamvadi jnanam). "Not contradicting [the real object) is based on the usefull action" (arthakriya-sthiti; PV II-3). For Dharmakirti, the relation with knowledge and the reality of the outside world is an important problem. An object which attains one's purpose is a reality. Dharmakirti considers that the means of obtaining true knowledge are perception (pratyaksa) and inference (anumana). Perception is 'free from conceptual construction'
(kalpanapodha) and 'nonerroneous' (abhranta) in the PVin and the NB. The ' erroneous' (bhranta) is where the sense organs (indriya) are affected by eye trouble, a rapid motion, travelling on a boat bad physical condition or other causes (NB 1-6). The sense organs which are affected by these erroneous influences, can't perceive an object correctly. Therefore, knowledge which is produced by erroneous influence doesn't correspond with an object. An object of erroneous knowledge doesn't have causal efficiency (arthakriya).
' Nonerroneous' (abhranti) is where A is perceived as non-A (PVin II-lcd).
When a non-object takes an illusionary 'form' (pratibhasa) and one apprehends that 'object', this is 'erroneous' (bhranti). However, the connection with knowledge and an object is 'nonerroneous' (avyabhicara). This is true knowledge (pramana; PVin II-lcomm.). 'Erroneous' means non-correspondence with knowledge and the form of the object. Since an object of inference isn't the object itself but the conceptual object, inference is 'erroneous' (bhranti). Though inference doesn't perceive the object itself, in case that inference accomplishes a human purpose viz. inference entailing 'useful action' (arthakriya), inference is pramana. An object of perception isn't the conceptual object but the form (pratibhasa; NB (13) 'Nonerroneous' in Dharmakirti's Definition of Perception (K. Yamamoto)' 1-13) of the object. Even though perception hasn't conception, it may be that one doesn't perceive the object correctly by erroneous influence on the sense organs thereby producing erroneous knowledge (PV III-293-299). To get rid of such knowledge of the object which doesn't entail arthakriya, Dharmakirti defined ' nonerroneous' (abhranta).
IV Dharmakirti followed Dignaga's thought in that (1) perception doesn't entail conception (kalpanapodha), (2) an object of perception is a particular real object (svalaksana) and (3) knowledge is self-cognitive knowledge (svasarnvedana). But Dharmakirti didn't think that all self-cognitive knowledge is certain knowledge, as Dignaga thought, but that reality has causal efficiency (arthakriya) and knowledge which corresponds with its real object is true knowledge. Since Dignaga considers that an object is knowledge itself and that there is no room for knowledge to contradictthe object,there isn't 'erroneous knowledge' (hhrantijnana) namely knowledge which contradicts the object. Consequently Dignaga needs not define 'nonerroneous' (abhranta). Still, the epistemology of Dharmakirti differs from Dignaga. Dharmakirti's problem is the relation between the empirical world and knowledge and so, because true knowledge is knowledge which corresponds with the reality of the empirical world which has causal efficiency (arthakriya), there is knowledge which contradicts an object even without conception. (kalpanapodha). Dharmakirti defines 'nonerroneous' (abhranta) to get rid of knowledge that contradicts the object. Dharmakirti didn't think that this ' nonerroneous' (abhranta) is used only in case of an exception of perception like eye trouble (timira). Dharmakirti says 'erroneous' (bhranta) refers to the organ senses being erroneously influenced by eye trouble, a rapid motion, travelling on a boat, bad physical condition or other causes. However, though eye trouble is an exceptional case, the other situations are common occurrences. Therefore if there is no definition such as 'nonerroneous' (abhranta), more than half of directly perceived knowledge will be erroneous knowledge. Consequently Dharmakirti defined 'nonerroneous' (abhranta) in his definition of perception.
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